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1 Introduction
When is ﬁnancial stability jeopardized by systemic events? Is there a maximum sus-
tainable debt burden? If there is, can it be empirically estimated and will exceeding
it necessarily result in a crisis? These are timely and important questions in the wake
of the recent ﬁnancial crisis and its evolution, yet empirical evidence on these issues
is rather scarce. Using data on aggregate U.S. credit losses, we show that debt sus-
tainability depends on ﬁnancial obligations ratios (interest payments and amortizations
relative to income) rather than on leverage (debt to income) which has been emphasized
in the literature. In particular, we are able to estimate threshold values, interpreted
as maximum sustainable debt burdens, for the ﬁnancial obligations ratios above which
ﬁnancial stability is jeopardized by systemic events.
Recent theories of ﬁnancial frictions emphasize the interplay between durable asset
prices and leverage in generating systemic crisis events.1 For instance, increases in the
price of durable assets raise the value of collaterals available to asset holders, thereby
providing them with new borrowing opportunities which may in turn reinforce asset
prices (see e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999)). If agents do not
internalize a pecuniary externality associated with ﬁre sales of assets in their demand
for credit, this type of interplay is likely to cause asset price bubbles and excessive
leverage. Such build-ups in leverage increase the likelihood of a ﬁnancial crisis in the
wake of an adverse shock to the economy (Krishnamurthy (2003), Lorenzoni (2008),
Gai et al. (2008), and Miller and Stiglitz (2010)). By reducing their lending standards
during booms, banks tend to exacerbate the problem (Ruckes (2004) and Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez (2006)).
As much as these theoretical arguments seem compelling, few empirical studies on
the relationship between leverage and ﬁnancial distress exist in the literature. Ex-
ceptions are the cross-country study by King (1994) and the recent contributions by
Mian and Suﬁ (2010). The former ﬁnds that countries with high degrees of household
leverage prior to the recession in the early nineties experienced larger output losses,
and the latter that those U.S. counties with high leverage growth prior to the recent
crisis experienced the biggest credit and output losses. Related are also studies which
construct leading indicators of banking system distress using data on asset prices and
leverage (e.g., Borio and Lowe (2002)). But, as pointed out by Jerome Stein (2010),
it can be diﬃcult to predict future crisis events based on variables which have experi-
enced growth for longer periods of time, such as leverage and asset prices.2 Moreover,
simple intertermporal correlations between growing variables do not necessarily imply
true relationships, as is well known.
1In the present paper, we exclusively focus on the role of credit risk in generating ﬁnancial distress.
Analyzes of the liquidity risk channel can be found in Smith (2002), Diamond and Rajan (2006), and
the references therein.
2Borio and Drehmann (2009) address this criticism by evaluating the out-of-sample predictive per-
formance of several leading indicators of banking system distress, constructed from data on asset price
and leverage “gaps” using a signal extraction method. They ﬁnd that an indicator which incorporates
property prices performs quite well with respect to the recent crisis.
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More important, Stein (2010) argues that debt sustainability should not be judged
by the amount of leverage on its own, but rather by the associated ﬁnancial obligations
as given by interest payments and amortizations. This is not a minor theoretical detail.
The fact that U.S. real and nominal interest rates have been declining over the past
decades, as pointed out by Caballero et al. (2008) among others, is likely to have a
signiﬁcant impact on debt sustainability. Thus, it is crucial to control for the terms
of credit when assessing the eﬀect of debt on ﬁnancial stability in general, and on the
recent crisis in particular.
In this paper we show that ﬁnancial obligations ratios, rather than leverage, have
the ability to explain ﬁnancial fragility. We assess measures of leverage and ﬁnancial
obligations ratios in terms of their explanatory power over credit loss dynamics, using
aggregate U.S. data over the period 1985Q1-2010Q2. Contrary to the ﬁndings in the
existing literature, we ﬁnd that leverage measures as such cannot adequately account for
credit losses during systemic events. Financial obligations ratios, on the other hand,
can account for the salient features of credit losses, consistent with the theoretical
considerations in Stein (2010). Hence, ﬁnancial obligations ratios, rather than leverage,
are likely to be more informative of impending crises.
Speciﬁcally, we are able to estimate a threshold value for the ﬁnancial obligations
ratios, which can be interpreted as measuring a maximum sustainable debt burden
(MSDB). When the threshold value is exceeded, interactions between credit losses and
the business cycle become pivotal and even small adverse shocks can lead to massive
credit losses. We ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial obligations ratios typically exceed the estimated
thresholds 1-2 years prior to each recession or crisis in the sample period. Moreover,
the magnitude of the deviations between the ﬁnancial obligations ratios and their cor-
responding MSDB estimates, have explanatory power for the severity and length of the
ensuing recessions.
By distinguishing between diﬀerent loan categories, we also obtain new insights on
the relative importance of the business and household sectors in generating ﬁnancial
distress. For example, we ﬁnd that losses on real estate loans become highly sensitive
to adverse shocks when the ﬁnancial obligations ratio associated with households’ real
estate debt exceeds a threshold of slightly over 10%. This occurs during two periods
in our sample. The ﬁrst begins in 1989Q2, roughly one year prior to the recession in
the early 1990’s, and ends at its lowest point. The second begins in 2005Q1, more
than two years prior to the recent crisis, and has not yet ended by the last observation
in the sample (2010Q2). Hence, armed with this MSDB estimate it might have been
possible to detect the problems which led to the recent crisis a full two years before its
actual occurrence. We note that these two periods resulted in unusually large numbers
of bank failures, suggesting that ﬁnancial stability was jeopardized on both occasions.
Moreover, the magnitude by which the households’ ﬁnancial obligations ratio exceeded
the MSDB prior to the recent crisis may explain why only this period developed into
what is known as a full-blown ﬁnancial crisis.
Similarly, we ﬁnd that large losses on business loans typically ensue when the ﬁ-
nancial obligations ratio in the business sector exceeds an estimated threshold value.
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This occurs between 1-2 years prior to each recession or crisis over the sample period.
Credit losses associated with these occasions do not necessarily lead to large scale bank
failures, and may therefore be less detrimental to ﬁnancial stability than the losses
connected to real estate. Nevertheless they are likely to signiﬁcantly aﬀect the business
cycle.
Overall, our ﬁndings associated with the diﬀerent loan categories suggest that the
compositional dynamics in credit losses, resulting from the business and household
sectors, may be of particular importance for understanding ﬁnancial fragility. For in-
stance, the recent crisis was predominantly caused by too large ﬁnancial obligations in
the household sector, whereas the recession in the early nineties was more related to
the business sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the data, whereas
Section 3 discusses methodology and statistical models. The results are presented in
Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
In this section we introduce our data which consist of quarterly U.S. time-series observa-
tions covering the period 1985Q1-2010Q2. We begin by discussing aggregate credit loss
rates of commercial banks, which are informative as indicators of the level of distress
in the ﬁnancial system. As mentioned in the introduction, one of the key objectives
in this paper is to study the ability of leverage versus ﬁnancial obligations to explain
the variation in the loss rates, speciﬁcally during episodes of severe ﬁnancial distress.
Measures of these variables are introduced and discussed in Section 2.2. We also con-
trol for a number of variables which are potentially important for understanding credit
loss dynamics, such as real house prices, interest rates, monetary policy indicators,
and measures of real activity. These variables are introduced in Section 2.3. Detailed
descriptions of the variables and their sources are provided in Appendix A.
2.1 Credit losses and ﬁnancial distress
Almost all serious episodes of ﬁnancial turmoil in modern history have been associated
with massive credit losses (see e.g., Herring (1999)). As a ﬁrst ocular illustration,
Figure 1 shows the association between the rate of commercial bank failures in the
U.S. (panel a), and the loss rates on total loans (panel b), real estate loans (panel c),
and business loans (panel d). As is apparent, there are only two episodes of major
bank failures in our sample. The ﬁrst occurs between the late 80’s and early 90’s, and
is associated with the savings and loan crisis, whereas the second corresponds to the
recent ﬁnancial crisis. It is notable that the bank failure rate is very low between these
two periods, suggesting that the burst of the dot.com bubble had little eﬀect on the
incidence of bank failures. In contrast, the rate of losses on total loans displays peaks at
each of the three U.S. recessions in the sample, with the most recent one being almost
4
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Figure 1: Indicators of the level of distress in the U.S. banking system.
twice as severe as the previous ones.
Decomposing the total loss rate into those belonging to real estate and business
loans, as done in panels c and d, reveals a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two: the
time path of the loss rate on real estate loans (panel c) resembles that of the bank
failure rate to a much greater extent than the loss rate on business loans (panel d). This
suggests that ﬁnancial stability is more sensitive to real estate loans than to business
loans. The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 shows the relative importance of
these two loan categories in the banks’ aggregate loan portfolio. For instance, over
the sample the share of real estate loans has increased from 30% to 57%, whereas the
share of business loans has declined from 34% to 16%. Table 1 also shows that the
household sector share of real estate loans has increased from 48% to 56%, whereas
the corresponding business sector share has been fairly constant at slightly below 30%.
Thus, the U.S. banking system, as well as the household sector, have become more
exposed to real estate loans during the past 25 years.
To get an impression of how real estate losses are distributed between households
and businesses, Figure 2 decomposes the loss rate on total real estate loans into these
two sectors (available from 1991Q1 onward). The ﬁgure shows that the real estate losses
associated with the 1990 recession were almost exclusively related to business loans, in
line with the results in Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000), whereas in the recent crisis
both sectors experienced similar high loss rates. But as the households’ share in real
estate loans is almost twice as large as that of the business sector, the recent crisis
seems predominately related to the former sector.
For future use, we denote the credit loss rates by clTt , clRt , and clBt , where T , R and
B represent total, real estate, and business loans, respectively.
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Shares of diﬀerent loan categories in total loans
1985Q1 1990Q1 1995Q1 2000Q1 2005Q1 2010Q1
Share of total loans:
Real estate loans 30% 41% 46% 47% 57% 57%
Business loans 34% 28% 23% 26% 20% 16%
Other loansy 36% 31% 31% 27% 23% 27%
Share of real estate loans:
Household sector 48% 48% 59% 56% 58% 56%
Business sector 26% 29% 29% 28% 26% 26%
Other loansyy 26% 23% 12% 16% 16% 18%
yIncludes consumer loans, agricultural loans, loans to depository institutions, lease ﬁnancing
receivables, acceptances of other banks etc..
yyIncludes loans secured by farmland and loans for construction and land development.
Table 1: Decomposition of aggregate loan portfolios.
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Loss rate on households’ real estate loans 
Loss rate on total real estate loans 
(a) Loss rates on total vs. household sector real estate loans.
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(b) Loss rates on total vs. business sector real estate loans.
Figure 2: Loan loss rates on total, business sector, and household sector real estate loans.
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2.2 Leverage and ﬁnancial obligations
Panels (a)-(d) in Figure 3 depict debt to income ratios which we use as a measure of
leverage. We distinguish between the household (H) and business (B) sector on the one
hand, and between total (T ) and real estate (R) debt on the other. The corresponding
leverage measures are denoted by lijt , where i = H; B and j = T; R. As seen from
the ﬁgure, real estate loans constitute a large share of household debt (panels a and
b), whereas it is only a small part of business debt (panels c and d). While all these
measures are upward trending, household leverage displays the strongest growth rate.
As indicated in the introduction, increasing leverage is not necessarily problematic
by itself. This is because higher debt levels can be sustainable with lower levels of
interest rates or longer maturity of debt contracts. Since the increasing leverage of the
last decades has coincided with declining nominal and real interest rates, this aspect is
likely to be relevant. A measure that takes these factors into account is the ﬁnancial
obligations ratio, constructed by the Federal Reserve. It broadly consists of the sum of
interest payments and amortization on debt. Since this measure is only available for
the household sector, we construct a corresponding measure for the business sector by
using the federal funds rates as the relevant interest rate, a ﬁxed maturity of 3 years,3
and applying a linear amortization schedule.
Panels (e)-(h) in Figure 3 depict the ﬁnancial obligations ratios, denoted f ijt , where
i corresponds to the two sectors and j to the two debt categories. The graphs of these
ratios show less growth compared to the leverage variables. In particular, the ﬁnancial
obligations ratio on total business loans (panel g) seems mean reverting, albeit with
rather pronounced swings, suggesting that much of the upward trend in business sector
leverage is due to declining interest rates.
2.3 Interest rates, monetary policy, and indicators of real ac-
tivity
The discussion in previous section indicated that declining interest rates may partly be
responsible for the increases in leverage. Thus, we control for both real and nominal
interest rate movements in the subsequent analysis. The federal funds and government
rates are denoted by iMt and iGt , respectively, and their corresponding real (ex-post)
values are deﬁned by rMt = iMt   t and rGt = iGt   t, where t is the consumer price
inﬂation rate. These interest rates are depicted in Figure 4 (panels a and b).
We also include a measure of the monetary policy stance, calculated as the diﬀer-
ence between the federal funds rate and a standard Taylor’s rule, ~iTt .4 As discussed
by Rudebusch (2006), this measure captures both innovations to monetary policy and
3This value lies between the average maturities on ﬁrms’ bank loans reported in Stohs and Mauer
(1996) and Berger et al. (2005). We checked robustness of the results below by assuming 2 and 4 year
maturities. The results did not change signiﬁcantly and are available upon request.
4The rule is iTt = 3:5 + 1:5(t   2) + 0:5~yt. The coeﬃcient choices are standard in the literature,
apart from the constant which is estimated.
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Figure 3: Indicators of leverage and ﬁnancial obligations in the household and business sectors.
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line) long-term government T-bill rate.
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Figure 4: Various indicators of monetary and real conditions in the United Sates. The real (ex-
post) interest rates are constructed using the 4-quarter moving average inﬂation rate to facilitate the
exposition.
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auxiliary information used by the Federal Reserve. In addition, we include the spread
between the federal funds rate and the yield on long-term government bonds, ~iSt . This
measure is strongly associated with the business cycle, and has been viewed as an al-
ternative measure of the monetary policy stance (Bernanke and Blinder (1992)). These
two measures are depicted in panels (c) and (d). As a measure of real house prices,
pRt , we use the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) house price index divided by
the consumer price index. The recent boom in housing is clearly visible from Figure 4
(panel e). As an indicator of business cycle ﬂuctuations we use the output gap, ~yt,
depicted in panel (f).
3 Methodology
In this section, we discuss the dynamic behavior of the credit loss rates during episodes
of ﬁnancial distress and its implications for the choice of estimation strategy that is
subsequently applied in Section 4. We conclude the section by discussing the statistical
models which are used in the estimations.
3.1 Regime shifts, persistence and the econometric approach
A particularly striking feature of the credit loss rates in Figure 1 are their huge rates of
change during episodes of ﬁnancial distress, especially in the recent crisis period. Such
jump behavior may signal heightened sensitivity to aggregate economic conditions due
to systemic factors. The reason is that fundamentals aﬀect both households and busi-
nesses diﬀerently during episodes of severe ﬁnancial distress, when credit and collateral
constrains become binding, compared to normal periods.5 Our primary econometric ob-
jectives is to uncover the statistically relevant (transition) variable(s) which propagate
such regime shifts and to estimate the key parameters associated with them.
From a statistical point of view, regime shift dynamics can induce a degree of per-
sistence in the data which is diﬃcult to distinguish from unit-root dynamics in short
samples (Leybourne et al. (1998) and Nelson et al. (2001)). To study this aspect,
Figure 5 reports the spectral densities of the credit loss rates. As can be seen from
the ﬁgure, all credit loss rates show signiﬁcant variation at frequencies close to zero,
consistent with such an interpretation. However, this persistence may of course also
originate in some exogenous variable(s) which aﬀects the riskiness of loans, such as the
money market interest rate level. Indeed, we ﬁnd that our leverage variables, ﬁnancial
obligations ratios, real house prices, and interest rates (see ﬁgures 3 and 4) all display
stochastic trending or, alternatively, cycles of longer duration than the available sam-
ple.6 Hence, each of these variables may conceivably cause similar dynamics in the
5Christiano et al. (2004), for example, study monetary policy during a ﬁnancial crisis, which is
modeled as a period when collateral constraints become binding.
6Standard unit-root and stationarity tests indicate that these variables, as well as the credit loss
rates, display dynamics consistent with stochastic trends. The only exception is the ﬁnancial obliga-
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Figure 5: Spectral densities of the loan loss rates.
credit loss rates. As such persistence is easily confused with dynamics due to regime
shifts, it is crucial to distinguish between the two sources to get unbiased estimates of
the latter.
To address this problem we initially restrict attention to the pre-crisis sample
1985Q1-2006Q4, where regime shift dynamics are less likely to have played a domi-
nant role in credit loss determination.7 To identify the sources of persistence associated
with fundamentals, we model each of the credit loss rates jointly with the other persis-
tent variables (both individually and in selected groups), using the cointegrated vector
auto-regressive (VAR) model (see below). We then test whether the latter variables are
cointegrated and weakly exogenous with respect to the former. A variable that satisﬁes
both of these criteria can be considered a leading indicator of the long-run movements
in the credit loss rates. We use such variables to estimate the stochastic trends, sjt
for j = T; R; B, which generate persistence in the credit loss rates during “normal”
periods.
3.2 Statistical models
A convenient way of capturing long-run comovement between the credit loss rates and
other persistent variables during the pre-crisis period, is the cointegrated VAR model
yt =
k 1X
i=1
 iyt i +yt 1 + dt + "t (1)
where yt consists of the endogenous variables (including a credit loss rate), dt is a vector
of deterministic terms, "t  Np(0;), and k is the lag-length.
Cointegration in (1) can be tested by the likelihood ratio (LR) test for the rank of 
(Johansen (1996)). If the rank, r, is equal to p, then yt is stationary, i.e. yt  I(0). If
tions ratio on total business loans which is found to be stationary. We also note that the leverage
measures and the real house price exhibit signiﬁcant linear trends over the sample. These results are
available upon request.
7In fact, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant non-linearities (at the 5% signiﬁcance level) in the data for
the 1985Q1-2006Q4 sample, using the linearity test in Choi and Saikkonen (2004).
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0 < r < p, then  = 0, where  and  are two (pr) matrices of full column rank and
0yt 1 describes the cointegration relationships. In this case yt  I(1) and cointegrated
with r cointegration vectors, , and p  r common stochastic trends, assuming that the
“no I(2) trends” condition
0?(I  Pk 1i=1  i)? 6= 0 is met, where ? denotes orthogonal
complements. If r = 0, then yt  I(1) and the process is not cointegrated. A testing
sequence that ensures correct power and size starts from the null hypothesis of rank
zero and then successively increases the rank by one until the ﬁrst non-rejection.
When 0 < r < p, it is possible to test the hypothesis that a variable, yi;t say,
precedes the credit loss rate in question in the long-run. The test of this hypothesis is
asymptotically 2, and amounts to imposing zero-restrictions on a row of  correspond-
ing to yi;t. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, yi;t is said to be weakly exogenous
with respect to the long-run parameters of the model. An estimate of the stochastic
trend, st, associated with yi;t can, for example, be obtained from the moving average
representation of (1).
Given estimates of sjt for j = T; R; B, we can estimate the non-linear dynamics
associated with systemic events. We model this type of dynamics using a smooth
transition regression (STR) model for the credit loss rates over the full sample. This
model takes the form
~cl
j
t = (1  '(t))(1 +  01xt) + '(t)(2 +  02xt) + 0dt + t (2)
where ~cl
j
t = cl
j
t   sjt , xt is a vector of explanatory variables, t is a transition variable,
dt is a vector of deterministic terms, and t is assumed to be a mean zero stationary
disturbance term. In the empirical analysis (Section 4), xt is selected from the three
cyclical indicators ~iTt , ~iSt , and ~yt, whereas t is selected from a set which includes the
leverage variables, the ﬁnancial obligations ratios, and several control variables. The
transition function 0  '(t)  1 determines the relative weights between regimes 1
and 2. We assume that this function takes the form
'(t) =
1
1 + e 1(t 2)
giving symmetric weights around the threshold parameter, 2, where e is the natu-
ral exponent and '(2) = 1=2.8 Both the explanatory variables and the transition
variable are allowed to exhibit stochastic trends. This is convenient as all of the lever-
age measures and most of ﬁnancial obligations ratios display dynamics consistent with
unit-roots. We note that the stationarity assumption on the disturbance term implies
that ~cl
j
t and xt are either linearily or non-linearily cointegrated. Thus, verifying this
assumption ensures model consistency, as well as safeguards against spurious results,
for example due to growth correlations over time.
We apply a linearity test by Choi and Saikkonen (2004) to identify the statistically
signiﬁcant transition variables. The test is based on a Taylor series approximation of
8The signal extraction method outlined in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) also involves estimating
critical thresholds and is, in this particular respect, similar in spirit to our approach.
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Linear cointegration results
1985Q1-2006Q4 1985Q1-2010Q2
y0t r = 0 r  1 cl = 0 iM = 0 r = 0 r  1 cl = 0 iM = 0
(clTt ; i
M
t )
0 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.42 0.96 0.98 – –
(clRt ; iMt )0 0.01 0.79 0.00 0.13 0.95 0.94 – –
(clBt ; i
M
t )
0 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.54 0.27 0.29 – –
Table 2: Linear cointegration results. Notes: The rows labeled “r = 0” and “r  1” report the
p-values of the LR tests for the rank of . The last two rows report the p-values from testing weak
exogeneity for each of the variables in xt. Boldface values indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
(2), which under the null hypothesis of linearity will not contain any signiﬁcant second
(or higher) order polynomial terms. However, under the STR alternative, all signiﬁcant
higher order terms will involve the transition variable, t. Hence, statistically valid
transition variables can be detected by applying the test successively to each variable
from the set of potential transition variables. As discussed in the introduction, such
information may be helpful in distinguishing between competing explanations for the
recent crisis, such as lax monetary policy or excessive debt.
4 Results
This section reports the main empirical ﬁndings. Section 4.1 ﬁrst investigates whether
the persistence in the credit loss rates is primarily due to exogenous factors or related
to regime shifts (or both). Next, Section 4.2 compares the aptitude of leverage and
ﬁnancial obligations for explaining credit loss dynamics. Finally, Section 4.3 reports the
estimates associated with regime shift dynamics, and shows that they are informative
about debt sustainability.
4.1 Linearity vs. regime shifts
To identify the sources of persistent movements in the credit loss rates over the pre-
crisis sample 1985Q1-2006Q4, we estimate (1) for each of the three credit loss rates
combined with groups of variables consisting of at least one of the variables introduced
in sections 2.2 and 2.3.
The left hand side of Table 2 reports the results of the LR test for the rank of  and
tests of weak exogeneity (conditional on r = 1) in estimates of (1) with yt = (cl
j
t ; i
M
t )
0,
j = T; B; R, k = 2, a restricted constant, three centered seasonal dummies, and
transitory impulse dummies to account for a few additive outliers in the credit loss rates
(reported in Appendix A). As can be seen from the table r = 0 is rejected, whereas
r  1 cannot be rejected, in all three models. Furthermore, weak exogeneity is always
rejected for the credit loss rates, but never rejected for the federal funds rate. This
suggests that the declining interest rates during the past decades have reduced credit
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risks associated with the existing stock of loans in banks’ loan portfolios, consistent
with Altunbas et al. (2010). We also ﬁnd that none of the other variables, including
the leverage and ﬁnancial obligations ratios, satisfy both of these criteria.9
We next investigate whether a linear combination between the federal funds rate and
the credit loss rates continue to be cointegrated in the full sample, 1985Q1-2010Q2. As
the results in the right hand side of Table 2 show, cointegration between the variables
breaks down in this case suggesting that the credit loss rates follow a diﬀerent parameter
regime in the crisis period. This is consistent with the nonlinear hypothesis in (2). We
investigate this possibility using the linearity test of Choi and Saikkonen (2004). Prior
to the estimations, we remove the persistent (stochastic) trend associated with the
interest rate decline, st, from the credit loss rates, where the former is estimated by the
Hodric-Prescott ﬁltered federal funds rate.10 The ﬁltered loss rates are denoted by ~cl
j
t ,
for j = T; R; B and depicted in Figure 6.
We test the null hypothesis of linearity against the STR model alternative in (2) and
try diﬀerent alternatives for xt and t. In particular, we use the interest rate spread, ~iSt ,
and the output gap, ~yt,11 both individually and jointly, as explanatory variable(s), and
successively try each of ~iTt , ~iSt , pRt , l
ij
t , and f
ij
t (i = H; B and j = T; R) as transition
variable. Initial results show that output gap movements, ~y, is neither signiﬁcant in
the ﬁrst nor in the second regime in the model for the loss rate on business loans, ~cl
B
t ,
and was hence excluded from xt in this equation. Both ~yt and ~iSt produced signiﬁcant
results in the remaining models. Hence, we use xt = (~iSt ; ~yt)0 in the models for the loss
rate on total loans and real estate loans, ~cl
T
t and ~cl
R
t , as well as xt = ~iSt in the model of
~cl
B
t .
Given the indicated choices of xt, Table 3 reports the results of the linearity tests
corresponding to each potential transition variable. For the pre-crisis period, the results
in the upper part of the table show that the null hypothesis of linearity cannot be
rejected in any of the models. However, turning to the lower part of Table 3, we see
that the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected for several potential transition variables
in the full sample. For instance, in the model for the loss rate on real estate loans, ~cl
R
t ,
there seems to be signiﬁcant non-linearities associated with the interest rate spread,
the household and business sector real estate debt to income ratios, and the household
9These results are omitted for brevity, but are available upon request. We also tried per capita
GDP, the inﬂation rate, the unemployment rate, and the real exchange rate. None of these were found
to be both cointegrated and weakly exogenous with respect to the credit loss rates.
10This is statistically justiﬁed if the federal funds rate is strongly exogenous. Exclusion restrictions
on the cljt terms in the equation for iMt in (1) produced marginal signiﬁcance levels of 0.26, 0.03
and 0.37 for j = T; R; B, respectively. Hence, in conjunction with results on weak exogeneity, these
results imply that the federal funds rate is strongly exogenous with respect to the credit loss rates
(or close to in the case of clRt ). We also checked robustness with respect to this estimate of st, by
estimating (2) with cljt on the left hand side and iMt added to the right hand side. This did not change
the results below to any signiﬁcant degree.
11We also tried the deviations from Taylor’s rule, ~iTt , in xt, but this variable was not signiﬁcant in
any of the estimated regimes, and hence excluded from the analysis.
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(b) Filtered loss rate on business loans.
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(c) Filtered loss rate on real estate loans.
Figure 6: Indicators of ﬁnancial distress with stochastic trend component removed.
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Tests of linearity vs. regime shifts
1985Q1-2006Q2
~cl
j
t n t ~iTt ~iSt pRt lHt lHRt lBt lBRt Ht HRt Bt BRt
~cl
T
t 0.244 0.170 0.918 0.828 0.719 0.535 0.419 0.963 0.406 0.780 0.570
~cl
R
t 0.330 0.085 0.187 0.363 0.597 0.489 0.688 0.108 0.085 0.221 0.583
~cl
B
t 0.559 0.582 0.249 0.370 0.408 0.072 0.256 0.132 0.929 0.141 0.420
1985Q1-2010Q2
~cl
j
t n t ~iTt ~iSt pRt lHt lHRt lBt lBRt Ht HRt Bt BRt
~cl
T
t 0.819 0.021 0.034 0.016 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.181 0.041 0.411 0.037
~cl
R
t 0.617 0.015 0.168 0.059 0.042 0.052 0.021 0.738 0.018 0.940 0.054
~cl
B
t 0.784 0.338 0.068 0.048 0.049 0.006 0.029 0.058 0.151 0.021 0.064
Table 3: Tests of linearity against a STR alternative. Bold values indicate rejection of the null
hypothesis at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
sector’s real estate ﬁnancial obligations ratios. In the model for the loss rate on business
loans, ~cl
B
t on the other hand, all debt to income ratios and the ﬁnancial obligations ratio
in the business sector, are signiﬁcant. The results of the model for the loss rate on total
loans, ~cl
T
t are, by and large, a combination of the results from the models of ~cl
R
t and
~cl
B
t .
Summarizing, we ﬁnd that the federal funds rate can be considered a leading indi-
cator of long-run movements in the credit loss rates. While regime shifts do not play
a very dominant role in the pre-crisis period, they are crucial for describing credit loss
dynamics in the full sample, and in particular during the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
4.2 Leverage vs. ﬁnancial obligations
Next we estimate (2) for each the three credit loss rates, ~cl
j
t , with xt as above, and
t successively equal to one of the transition variable candidates that has a signiﬁcant
entry in Table 3. When t equals the interest rate spread, ~iSt , the real house price, pRt ,
or any of the leverage variables, lijt , we ﬁnd that either the estimate of the threshold
parameter, 2, lies outside the range of the relevant transition variable or that the
statistical ﬁt of the model is poor, or both. More important, unit-roots cannot be
rejected in the residuals of these models, implying that the underlying assumptions of
the cointegrated STR-model are not satisﬁed. Hence, these variables, and leverage in
particular, cannot adequately account for the large and persistent ﬂuctuations in the
credit loss rates associated with the regime-shift dynamics.
In contrast, when any of the signiﬁcant ﬁnancial obligations ratios in Table 3 are
used, we get stationary residuals, a good statistical ﬁt, and a threshold parameter
estimate which is in the range of the relevant transition variable. It is also notable from
the table, that the ﬁnancial obligations ratios related to household real estate debt and
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STR estimates
Transition parameters Regime 1 Regime 2
~cl
i
t t 1 2 ~iS ~y ~iS ~y
~cl
T
t f
HR
t 12:678
(5:630)
10:192
(0:056)
 0:063
(0:034)
0:002
(0:045)
 0:276
(0:094)
 0:224
(0:051)
~cl
R
t f
HR
t 3:609
(1:128)
10:079
(0:106)
 0:023
(0:041)
 0:051
(0:038)
 0:267
(0:099)
 0:243
(0:049)
~cl
B
t f
BT
t 2:318
(0:968)
10:44
(0:199)
 0:249
(0:085)
–  0:619
(0:119)
–
Table 4: Estimated transition parameters and regime coeﬃcients from STR-models of the adjusted
credit loss rates.
total business debt, fHRt and fBTt , are the only statistically valid transition variables
in the models for the loss rate on real estate loans and business loans ~cl
R
t and ~cl
B
t ,
respectively. Finally, we note that the ﬁnancial obligations ratios associated with real
estate debt in both the household and business sector, fHRt and fBRt , produce sensible
results in the model for the loss rate on total loans, ~cl
T
t . We choose the former ﬁnancial
obligations ratio as it produces a somewhat better ﬁt and higher likelihood than the
latter.
Based on these results we conclude that leverage variables may not be able to signal
an impending crisis with any suﬃcient precision. Financial obligations ratios, on the
other hand, seem more relevant in this respect, as they can account for regime shift
dynamics in the credit loss rates associated with episodes of severe ﬁnancial distress.
4.3 Explaining credit losses
Table 4 reports the key parameter estimates of the STR-models. As can be seen from
the table, both the estimated coeﬃcients measuring the speed of transition between
regimes, 1, and the estimated thresholds, 2, are positive, indicating that regime 2
dominates for values above the thresholds. Furthermore, the estimates of 1 indicate
that speeds of transitions between regimes are rather fast in all cases. Each regime is
characterized by the parameters ~iS and ~y, describing the eﬀect of ~iSt and ~yt on ~cl
j
t in
the relevant regime (except in the equation for ~cl
B
t where only ~iSt enter the regimes).
The parameters in the ﬁrst regime are generally negative but not signiﬁcant, whereas
in the second regime both parameters become negative and signiﬁcant. It is notable
that the eﬀect on credit losses from a change in the output gap or the interest rate
spread is much larger in the second regime. Therefore, the ﬁnancial system becomes
much more exposed to real economic ﬂuctuations when the ﬁnancial obligations ratios
are above the estimated threshold values. Thus, the second regime describes unstable
periods where even small negative shocks can lead to massive credit losses. In this sense,
the threshold values, 2, can be viewed as estimates of the maximum sustainable debt
burden (MSDB) with respect to a given credit category. Our estimates suggest that the
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Figure 7: Transitions in the loss rate on real estate loans. The upper panel depicts the loss rate
on real estate loans, whereas the lower panel depicts the ﬁnancial obligations ratio associated with
household’s real estate debt and the corresponding MSDB estimate. Episodes when regime 2 dominate
are demarked by grey bars.
levels of both total loans and real estate loans become unsustainable (i.e. susceptible
to high loss rates), when the ﬁnancial obligation ratio associated with households real
estate loans exceed 10.19% and 10.08%, respectively. Similarly, the level of business
loans becomes unsustainable when the ﬁnancial obligations ratio associated with total
business debt exceeds 10.44%.
The upper panel of Figure 7 depicts the loss rate on real estate loans, and the lower
panel depicts the ﬁnancial obligations ratio related to household real estate debt along
with a line demarking the corresponding MSDB estimate. The periods during which
the second regime dominates are demarked by grey bars in the ﬁgure. As can be seen,
there are only two unstable periods in the sample. The ﬁrst begins in 1989Q2, roughly
one year in advance of the recession in the early 1990’s, and ends at its peak. The
second begins in 2005Q1, over two years in advance of the recent crisis, and has not yet
ended by the last observation in our sample (2010Q2). Hence, armed with this MSDB
estimate it might have been possible to foresee the recent crisis a full two years before
its actual occurrence. In addition, the magnitude and duration by which the ﬁnancial
obligations ratio exceed the MSDB line seem to explain both the severity and length of
the ensuing downturns. Indeed, this may explain why only the latter period developed
into what is known as a full-blown ﬁnancial crisis.
Similarly, Figure 8 depicts the loss rate on business loans and the corresponding
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Figure 8: Transitions in the loss rate on business loans. The upper panel depicts the loss rate on
business loans, whereas the lower panel depicts the ﬁnancial obligations ratio associated with total
business sector debt and the corresponding MSDB estimate. Episodes when regime 2 dominate are
demarked by grey bars.
ﬁnancial obligations ratio. As can be seen form the ﬁgure, there are three unstable
periods in our sample, each beginning between 1-2 years prior to one of the three
known U.S. recessions in the sample, and ending roughly at their peaks. Note also,
that prior to the 1990’s recession, the MSDB of business loans is exceeded in 1988Q2,
a full year earlier than the MSDB of households real estate loans. However, prior to
the recent crisis the relative timing is reversed, i.e. the household sector MSDB was
exceeded ﬁrst.
5 Conclusions
Recent theories on the connection between ﬁnancial frictions and systemic events have
highlighted the role of leverage. However, these theories are silent about the eﬀect of
interest rates and debt maturity on debt sustainability. In this study we investigate
the abilities of debt to income ratios, a measure of leverage, and ﬁnancial obligations
ratios, which capture the notion of debt burdens, to account for dynamics related to
systemic events in credit loss rates over the period, 1985Q1-2010Q2.
We document three important ﬁndings: (i) Leverage increases cannot, by them-
selves, adequately account for credit loss dynamics related to systemic events, contrary
to ﬁndings in the existing literature. The major reason for this result is that the per-
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sistent declines in interest rate levels throughout the period have altered the degrees of
leverage which are sustainable. In contrast, ﬁnancial obligations ratios, which explic-
itly take the terms of credit into account, can be used to capture the salient features of
credit loss dynamics. (ii) Episodes of ﬁnancial distress generally follow 1-2 years after
ﬁnancial obligations ratios in the household or business sectors cross estimated critical
threshold values form below, and end shortly after these ratios return to below thresh-
old values. The estimated thresholds are slightly above 10% in both sectors, and can
be interpreted as measuring a maximum sustainable debt burden (MSDB). Moreover,
the magnitude of the corresponding deviations from the MSDB, has explanatory power
with respect to the severity and length of the ensuing recessions. (iii) Severe events
also follow when both household and business sector ﬁnancial obligations ratios reach
unsustainable levels simultaneously. Such event are more rare, as the cycle in house-
hold sector ﬁnancial obligations ratios, which is primarily related to real estate debt,
is of signiﬁcantly longer duration than the corresponding business sector cycle. In this
sense, the former cycle may be more revealing about impending ﬁnancial crises. This
ﬁnding in consistent with Leamer (2008), among others, who highlight the importance
of household ﬁnance for macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
The empirical ﬁndings of the present paper point to the central role of real estate
ﬁnancial obligations in generating crisis events. As households, in particular, seem to
have higher exposure to this debt category, it would be desirable to decompose the
ﬁnancial obligations according to various households characteristics, for example with
respect to age and income cohorts (Iacoviello (2005)). Indeed, such decompositions can
likely provide us with more precise MSBD estimates, and thus with better assessments
of the systemic credit risk exposures of banks arising from household ﬁnance.
20
References
Altunbas, Y., Gambacorta, L., Marques-Ibanez, D., 2010. Does monetary policy aﬀect
bank risk-taking?, BIS Working Papers, No 298.
Berger, A., Espinosa-Vega, M., Frame, S., Miller, N., 2005. Debt maturity, risk, and
asymmetric information. The Journal of Finance 60, 2895–2923.
Bernanke, B., Blinder, A., 1992. The federal funds rate and the channels of monetary
transmission. American Economic Review 82, 901–921.
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., Gilchrist, S., 1999. The ﬁnancial accelerator in a quanti-
tative business cycle framework. In: Taylor, J., Woodford, M. (Eds.), Handbook of
Macroeconomics, vol. 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Borio, C., Drehmann, M., 2009. Assessing the risk of banking crises - revisited, BIS
Quarterly Review, March.
Borio, C., Lowe, P., 2002. Asset prices, ﬁnancial and monetary stability: exploring the
nexus, BIS Working Papers, no 114.
Caballero, R., Farhi, E., Gourinchas, P., 2008. An equilibrium model of "global imbal-
ances" and low interest rates. American Economic Review 98, 358–393.
Choi, I., Saikkonen, P., 2004. Testing linearity in cointegrating smooth transition re-
gressions. Econometrics Journal 7, 341–365.
Christiano, L., Gust, C., Roldos, J., 2004. Monetary policy in a ﬁnancial crisis. Journal
of Economic Theory 119, 64–103.
Dell’Ariccia, G., Marquez, R., 2006. Lending booms and lending standards. The Journal
of Finance 61, 2511–2546.
Diamond, D., Rajan, R., 2006. Money in a theory of banking. American Economic
Review 96, 30–53.
Gai, P., Kapadia, S., Millard, S., Perez, A., 2008. Financial innovation, macroeconomic
stability and systemic crises. The Economic Journal 118, 401–426.
Herring, R., 1999. Credit risk and ﬁnancial instability. Oxford Review of Economic
Policy 15, 63–79.
Iacoviello, M., 2005. House prices, borrowing constraints, and monetary policy in the
business cycle. American Economic Review 95, 739–764.
Johansen, S., 1996. Likelihood-Based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Auto-Regressive
Models. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
21
Kaminsky, G., Reinhart, C., 1999. The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-
of-payments problems. American Economic Review 89, 473–500.
King, M., 1994. Debt deﬂation: Theory and evidence. European Economic Review 38,
419–455.
Kiyotaki, N., Moore, J., 1997. Credit cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105, 211–248.
Krishnamurthy, A., 2003. Collateral constraints and the ampliﬁcation mechanism. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 111, 277–292.
Leamer, E., 2008. Macroeconomic Patterns and Stories. Berlin: Springer.
Leybourne, S., Newbold, P., Vougas, D., 1998. Unit roots and smooth transitions.
Journal of time series analysis 19 (1), 83–97.
Lorenzoni, G., 2008. Ineﬃcient credit booms. Review of Economic Studies 78, 809–833.
Mian, A., Suﬁ, A., 2010. The great recession: Lessons from microeconomic data. Amer-
ican Economic Review 100, 1–10.
Miller, M., Stiglitz, J., 2010. Leverage and asset bubbles: Averting armageddon with
chapter 11? The Economic Journal 120, 500–518.
Nelson, C., Piger, J., Zivot, E., 2001. Markov regime switching and unit-root tests.
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 19, 404–415.
Peek, J., Rosengren, E., 1997. The international transmission of ﬁnancial shocks: The
case of japan. The American Economic Review 87, 495–505.
Peek, J., Rosengren, E., 2000. Collateral damage: Eﬀects of the japanese bank crisis on
real activity in the united statesauthor. The American Economic Review 90, 30–45.
Ruckes, M., 2004. Bank competition and credit standards. The Review of Financial
Studies 17, 1073–1102.
Rudebusch, G., 2006. Monetary policy inertia: Fact or ﬁction? International Journal
of Central Banking 2, 85–135.
Smith, B., 2002. Monetary policy, banking crises, and the friedman rule. American
Economic Review 92, 128–134.
Stein, J., 2010. A critique of the literature on the US ﬁnancial debt crisis, CESifo
Working Paper No. 2924.
Stohs, M., Mauer, D., 1996. The determinants of corporate debt maturity structure.
The Journal of Business 69, 279–312.
22
Appendix A
The sources and deﬁnitions of the data are reported in Table 5. In addition, a few
transitory impulse dummies were used in connection with the VAR estimates. These
dummies (labeled DY Y Q) take the value 1 at date Y Y Q and -1 at the consecutive
date, where Y Y and Q refer to the year and quarter digits, respectively. The model for
yt = (cl
T
t ; i
M
t )
0 includes D894, the model for yt = (clRt ; iMt )0 includes D904, D914 and
D923, and the model for yt = (clRt ; iMt )0 includes D894 and D014.
Data and deﬁnitions
Var.: Deﬁnition:
cljt Net charge-oﬀ rate on loan category j of all insured U.S. commercial banks.
j = T (total loans), R (real estate loans), and B (business loans). Source: FRS
ljt Debt to income ratio (in %). j = H (total debt, households’), HR (real estate debt,
households’), B (total debt, businesses), BR (real estate debt, businesses).
Income equals total wages and salaries for households and non farm business
income for businesses. Sources: FRS and BEA.
f jt Financial obligations ratio. For j = H; HR the series are taken from the FRS. For
j = B; BR the series are calculated as ljt iMt =400 + l
j
t=12.
pRt House price index (all transactions) divided by CPI index. Sources: FHFA and BLS.
iMt Eﬀective federal fund rate (3-month average). Source: FRS
iGt Yield on 10-year Treasury securities. Source: FRS
t Consumer price inﬂation (4-quarter moving average). Source: BLS
ut Unemployment rate (seasonally unadjusted). Source: BLS
qt Real eﬀective exchange rate (CPI weighted). Source: OECD
~iSt iMt   iGt
~iTt Deviations from a standard Taylor’s rule, ~iTt = iMt   3:5  1:5(t   2)  0:5~yt.
~yt 100(ln(Yt=Y t ), where Yt is real output and Y t is potential output. Source: OECD.
yLt GDP per capita. Source: BEA.
y Sources: Federal Reserve System (FRS), Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Congressional
budget oﬃce (CBO), OECD databases (OECD), Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
Table 5: Variable deﬁnitions and sources.
23
